Forgery (Dec 2008)

Essay on 'Forgery' (Dec 2008)

Evaluate the claim that a forgery is of less aesthetic worth than an original (essay December 2008)

At the end of 2007, the press reported that the Greenhalgh family from Bolton in England, for over twenty years, produced and sold many artworks, covering four millennia ranging from Anglo-Saxon silver, to modern paintings. ⁽¹⁾ It was estimated that the family raised £1million and yet continued to live in their council house with modest furnishing and minimal everyday luxuries. This is at odds with the Hollywood glamour that portrays criminals who operate in this world. It is fun and entertaining to belief in these modern day fairy tales, but one should also be cautious and remember that these fraudulous activities do not imitate a Robin Hood lifestyle, but can support other criminal activities, similar to those funded by stolen artworks.⁽²⁾

In this essay, I shall illustrate that the production of a forgery has a negative effect on the artwork, the artist, the public and society, similar to a ripple of ‘ever increasing circles’ . The creative activities of a forger usually boil down to financial gain and ultimately his or her actions are morally wrong. Any aesthetic value a viewer might enjoy is based on the direct connotation the work has with the original creator - the artist - and it is this conclusion I shall explore in the next few pages. In the context of our philosophical evaluation, however, one must consider what is fake art vis-à-vis genuine art, and if one concludes that fake art is not art, does one mean it is merely aesthetically inferior to genuine art, and that it could contain some value otherwise?

According to Gordon Graham, when asking ‘what is art?’ this question is only worth asking if one opts for the answer that art matters. “In other words “, he continues, “a concern with what is art is not just a matter of classification, but a matter of cultural esteem.”⁽³⁾  In order to ascertain the value of art, one should look at art in a context of ‘pleasure, beauty, emotion and understanding’. However, none of these criteria take away from the ‘art of forgery’ as fakes can deepen our experiences, and furthermore, forgery might even promote these very same basic human concepts of pleasure, beauty, emotion and understanding. Indeed, the philosopher Alfred Lessing ⁽⁴⁾ explains that as far as an aesthetic experience is concerned, forgery does not necessarily lessen our appreciation, except perhaps when the perceiver realises the deceit, at which point the cultural value and aesthetic appreciation can all but evaporate. More on this relationship between fake art and the viewer will be discussed later on.

So how do we value the difference between our aesthetic enjoyment of a real work of art and of a forgery? In today’s society, we are constantly exposed to graphic and sonic signs representing a multitude of expressions that are commercial, individual, artistic, collective, exclusive… an endless list. This overwhelmingly available array can be confusing as we are increasingly knowledgeable on both the contents of these messages and the many cultural environments in which they operate.

Defining art and the value of such a definition in a philosophical context has been the subject of many debates for a long time now. For the sake of this exercise, a nominational approach would be a good starting point. One definition of ‘art’ as ‘the quality, production, expression, or realm, according to aesthetic principles, of what is beautiful, appealing, or of more than ordinary significance’ ⁽⁵⁾ cannot be measured against a forgery as these very same criteria can quite easily be fulfilled with a fake.
What fails in this definition is using aesthetic principles as criteria, thus comparing any artwork to the subjective but critical analysis of taste and beauty. Both taste and beauty are subjective criteria and the appreciation of a work of art could not be more or less if we view the original or a fake.

It seems that the negative connotation associated with ‘fakes’ lies in the ‘fraudulent use’ of the work rather than any of the aesthetic principals which are subjective to measure. This implies that the making of the work is not, as such, a ‘devaluation’ (or a crime, if considered legally), it is more relating to its purpose or intention. So, in essence, one could say that anyone painting (read ‘copying’) a Picasso to adorn a wall would be acceptable, but selling this painting as if it was indeed produced by the hand of Picasso is a different matter. And so, this brings us to the concept of identity, authenticity and intellectual property or the first circle of influence.

The implication for the artwork and the artist
Well-known artists may well feel flattered when one of their works shows up at an auction or gallery and turns out to be an imitation. Of course, in most of these circumstances the work can be authenticated. ⁽⁶⁾ However lesser known artists may not be so fortunate of course. After years of struggling financially or getting any peer or commercial recognition, some do get their breakthrough. Few will have any of their original artworks still in their studio, having sold these pieces for a handful of pounds or dollars, in order to make a living. Any imitations in this respect will have the value of stolen identity, both in terms of the artist and the work. Martin Heidegger’s existentialism perfectly sums up the identification of the individualistic impulse with the artistic act: ‘the artist is the origin of the work. The work is the origin of the artist. Neither is without the other.’ ⁽⁷⁾ Fakes break this code and thus create a false identity.

In a semiotic context, the Czech aesthetician Jan Mukařovskў explored the relationship between artist and the material and concluded:
 “ (…) The influence of the material on the original organisation of the work was so considerable that the later transference into a different material was not sufficient to conceal it. Hence it is obvious that the material by which particular arts as a whole differ from the others is not merely a passive basis of artistic creativity but is an almost active factor that directs the activity and constantly intervenes - whether positively or negatively - in it.”  ⁽⁸⁾

In other words: meaning lies not just in the visual aspect but in the materials used.
And the imitator has no choice but to use different materials: be it their quality, composition, manufacturing and applied technique. This is true not only in the visual arts, but also for music and theatre where sounds and words also go through this manufacturing creative process. Lessing did not believe that forgery was possible in the performing arts, yet I believe that poets’ style, musical lyrics and scores have been used fraudulently, precisely because the artistic ‘mass’ is transient, only relying on intellectual thought and rationale. With nowadays music increasingly being broadcast digitally, sounds can easily and perfectly be copied and mutated into other scores and compilations. Sound ‘bites’ are difficult to trace and anonymously and flawlessly absorbed into our contemporary music culture.

Another important consideration is that a fake does not account for the artist’s selection process that is involved in producing the work. Poets and authors go through many drafts, painters produce many sketches and defunct canvasses, sculptors make drawings and molds in producing the ultimate cast or model. The artist can truly be seen as a performer, the work as an expression over time.
It explains that artistic production is evolving over time, with input and output in a linear sequence, something art historians then delve into and call ‘periods’. Fakes rip the work out of this context, destroying the semantic meaning. This, in effect is Lessing’s conclusion when referring to the concept of ‘originality’: a work of art is not a forgery when ‘it was created at a certain time in the history and development of the art’ ⁽⁹⁾ Yet it is important to consider that forgeries can be made by contemporaries but as such they too would be ‘breaking the code’. And whilst some forgeries may well have a similar technique or execution, they would lack ‘originality’ which lies at the heart of all art.

However, as mentioned before, ‘the meaning’ conveyed in art is not lost through a fake. The philosopher Richard Eldridge ⁽¹⁰⁾ points out that human cultural representation presents ‘instances of kinds and connections among kinds that matter to us by engaging our broader interest in truth, over and above survival.’ Yet, in this context one can argue that fakes are good: reproduction of originals that otherwise could not be possessed may promote many more individuals to benefit from these art works. If this would lead to a broader interest in truth and above all ‘survival’ then… why not? The answer is however, not so simple: not many fakes are reproduced ‘in good faith’ and greed usually gets the better of it.

There are occasions though where copies are legitimate: limited edition prints and multiple three dimensional casts are true (almost identical) copies, each one being ‘numbered’ and thus offering multiple recipients the benefit of aesthetic pleasure and sound financial investment. Copies in this context are not the physical reproduction. Their multiple editions were originated by the artist who has the intellectual property of the work. Any unintentional copy is not part of this cycle of creation and therefore cannot be considered aesthetically original.

The effect on the public
One can argue that a forgery not only lacks this originality but also, following Denis Dutton’s line of thinking it misrepresents achievement. ⁽¹¹⁾
Artistic worth is therefore not only what the artist values but more so it is valued by the community the artist lives and works in, our second circle of influence. The community can be both on a local and international scale. In the case of a forgery, we are dealing with this ‘negative’ achievement: it removes from the original work the artist’s meaning and intentions, reducing it to a commodity.

Museums and galleries can be seen as modern temples of cultural worship and national identity. People take great pride in artworks as ‘national treasures’ to be saved and savoured and popularised in the media and the press. School trips are organised and talks and seminars held. Crowds visit and spend money in these new cathedrals.Galleries trade and promote their artists, in a competitive market, with very little room for financial manoeuvring.  Fakes betray this relationship of trust and esteem. Public funding can be fooled into buying these fake works, denying genuine pieces valuable exhibition space in crammed museums.⁽¹²⁾

However, fakes or more specifically ‘reproductions’ are not always seen as evil. In some cases, copies can be produced to preserve the original, in case the latter is fragile or under repair. Copies stop valuable originals from being further damaged. The value of these fakes lies not in what these imitations are but in what they safeguard.

The effect on society
The negative value of a fake lies in its historical context. The macro and micro conditions relating to the period when the artwork was created cannot be reproduced by a fake. As we are the product of our times, so too are the artworks that have been created.
The interaction between the artist and his or her contemporaries are part of a collective memory. In principle, society as a whole has contributed to the work of art. With any fakes, the timeline has been broken and as a result the artwork cannot be true.

Fakes are only the monetary residue of a society which today and in retrospect can value its aesthetic body. Van Gogh in his own lifetime only ever sold one painting, yet today his paintings are worth millions, offering a wealth of aesthetic enjoyment and inspiration to many people. Art is our cultural and intellectual patrimony, which goes well beyond its monetary value. Art is similar to our human DNA, whereby fakes behave like an invading virus, with a corrupting influence on morals and identity.The aesthetic value of fakes and imitations can only be measured in as far that they extend the intellectual property of the artist. However, in most cases fakes’ true purpose is in their financial aura, with any aesthetic value belonging to the artist who was the main inspiration.

References
(1)   O’Neill, S. and Jenkins, R. 17 November 2007, “The £10m art collection that was forged by a family in their garden shed in Bolton” article on website
http://entertainment.timesonline.co.uk/tol/arts_and_entertainment/visual_arts/article2886205.ece
(2) “What happens to stolen art?” article on BBC websitehttp://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/entertainment/arts/3590190.stm
(3) Graham, G. 2005 Philosophy of the Arts. An introduction to aesthetics. Third Edition, Routledge.
(4) Lessing, A. 2002 What is wrong with a Forgery? In:  A. Neill and A. Ridley (eds) Arguing about Art. Contemporary philosophical debates. London: Routledge, pp 87-99 .
(5) Definition of ‘art’ on the website Dictionary.com: http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/art?o=0
(6) Recently however, the street artist Banksy refused to get involved in any validation process for fear of being prosecuted for vandalism. See article on BBC websitehttp://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/edinburgh_and_east/7596740.stm
(7) Gooding, M. 2001 Movements in Modern Art: Abstract Art. London: Tate Publishing, pp.69
(8) Mukařovskў, Jan. 1976 ‘The Essence of Visual Arts’ in: Matejka L. and Titunik I. R. (eds.)Semiotics of the Art, Prague School Contributions. MIT Press, pp 229-244.
(9) Lessing Albert. 2002 What is wrong with a Forgery? In:  A. Neill and A. Ridley. (eds.) Arguing about Art. Contemporary philosophical debates. London: Routledge , pp 97.
(10) Eldridge R. 2003. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Art. Cambridge University Press, pp 41.
(11) Dutton D. 2002 Artistic Crimes In:  A. Neill and A. Ridley (eds.) Arguing about Art. Contemporary philosophical debates. London: Routledge, pp. 100-111.
(12) The Greenhalgh family were know to have presented 120 fakes to museums and auction houses, including Bonhams in London and Sotheby’s in New York.

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